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Abstract 
Using data on 194 location choices in 32 countries for a decade, we investigated locational 
determinants of Chinese Multinational Enterprises (MNEs). We found that State-Owned MNEs, 
compared to their peers without controlling state equity, are less concerned about political risk of 
the host country, but more responsive to favorable exchange rate between Chinese RMB and the 
host currency. Strategic intent of Chinese MNEs affects their location choice in a way that 
manufacturing oriented investment, compared to trading subsidiaries, is more attracted to 
countries with large market size and more deterred by high cost structure of the host country.  
Keywords: Location choice, Firm heterogeneity, Chinese MNEs, Conditional logistic regression, 
Nested logistic regression.  
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1. Introduction 
China has been one of the largest FDI recipient countries in the world since the 1990s. Having 
been portrayed as a magnet for inward FDI in the last two decades, it is emerging as one of the 
most important FDI export countries in the developing world (World Investment Report, 2006). 
Outward FDI growth is expected to accelerate in the future given China‟s large and growing 
holdings of foreign exchange reserves and the apparent determination of Chinese authorities to 
diversify holdings of foreign exchange reserves away from fixed income assets towards equity 
assets (Globerman & Shapiro, 2009). Although still a relatively nascent phenomenon, scholars 
have started to examine China‟s outward FDI from various aspects, such as strategic-seeking 
motivations of Chinese MNEs (Deng, 2009), characteristics of founders of Chinese MNEs and 
their initial attempts to internationalize their businesses (Liu, Xiao & Huang, 2008), international 
venturing activities (Yiu, Lau & Bruton,, 2007), and performance of overseas operations of 
Chinese MNEs in relation to their Indian counterparts (Henley, Kratzsch, Kulur & Tandogan , 
2008).  
      Location choice is one of the most crucial decisions that MNEs need to make in their 
internationalization process. Location is costly to alter, and also has a profound impact on the 
efficiency and effectiveness of firms' overseas investment (Bartik, 1985; Li & Park, 2006; Wei & 
Liu, 2001). It therefore has been at the core of academic theorizing in international business 
(Buckley, Clegg, Cross, Liu, Voss & Zheng, 2007). Researchers have addressed this question 
with various approaches, most of which are generated from the motives and rationale of FDI 
(Luo, 2002; Vernon, 1966). Most research in the literature of FDI location only focused on FDI 
from developed economies, less is understood about the determinants that attract FDI from 
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emerging markets, such as China. In addition, most empirical studies of FDI location so far were 
conducted to examine the motivations of FDI at country level by using macro-economic data. 
But macro-economic models of FDI are insufficient to explore firm-specific behavioral 
differences on FDI location decisions as FDI behavior of MNEs is typically a firm-level decision.  
      Responding to the research gap, the present study wants to make contribution to the literature 
by examining the interplay of country level and firm level factors on FDI location choice of 
Chinese MNEs. To the best of our knowledge, it is one of the first empirical studies concerning 
location decisions of China‟s MNEs, and it is our hope that it will open up more discussions on 
this important issue in future.    
 
2. Literature Review  
Traditionally, location choice of MNEs has been tested on the basis of aggregated data. The 
fixed attributes of the host country are treated as exogenous stimuli to attract FDI inflows 
(Dunning, 1981; Brainard, 1997; Carr, Markusen & Maskus, 2001; Blonigen, Davies, & Head, 
2003). This theoretical underpinning is also reflected in studies on the locational determinants of 
Chinese outward FDI. For example, using country level aggregated data, Buckley et al. (2007) 
investigate country characteristics that attract or deter Chinese outward FDI. They found low 
political risk of the host country is positively related to Chinese investment outflows between 
1982 and 1991, but this impact evaporates in the time period of 1992 to 2001. The impact of 
distance is significant and negative for the period between 1984 and 1991, but not for the period 
of 1992 to 2001. This may suggest that geographic proximity to China was a positive influence 
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on early Chinese outward FDI. Buckley et al. (2007) also found that Chinese outward FDI is 
attracted by market size in the case of OECD countries and to non-OECD countries which have 
strong previous trade relations with China. Duanmu and Guney (2009) extend this analysis by 
comparing the location choice of Chinese outward FDI with that of India. They found that 
Chinese outward FDI is drawn to countries with promising market size, previous trading 
relations with China, depreciating exchange rate against Chinese currency, and a sound 
institutional environment. Chinese firms tend to shy away from locations with vast geographic 
distances and high corporate taxes. These studies provide important insights into the macro 
pattern of China‟s overseas investment, but the aggregated country-level data makes it 
impossible to understand how firm level factors affect this decision making process.  
      A growing recognition has arisen recently that it is necessary to understand not only how 
aggregate FDI responses to the fixed attributes of host locations, but also the impact of strategic 
formulation at individual firm level (Buch, Kleinert, Lipponer, & Farid, 2005; Cantwell, 2009). 
This literature argues that many decisions related to overseas business, such as exporting, 
undertaking FDI, and location choice of FDI, are not simply a reaction to exogenous host 
country characteristics. Instead, these decisions are shaped by firms‟ inherent attributes and their 
strategic intent (Helpman, Melitz & Yeaple, 2004). Recent empirical studies have also provided 
evidence that while some fundamental macro-economic and political factors have important 
influence on firm‟s decisions to entry, firm level heterogeneity can modify the magnitude of such 
influence and even alter the direction of the impact of these factors. For example, while 
economic and political risk are commonly perceived as negative factors in attracting MNEs, state 
shareholders are found to be more tolerant towards risk compared to private ones. In addition, 
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accumulated international experience makes MNEs more, not less, alert to the political risk of 
host countries (Garcia-Canal & Guillen, 2008). Similarly, while all firms could benefit from 
agglomeration effects, less-capable firms collate less than more-capable firms because of their 
concern of the simultaneous competition effort from collation (Alcacer, 2006). Moreover, 
although high technology endowment of the host country is generally an attractive factor, it 
proves to be more relevant to MNEs in research-intensive industries compared to those in low-
tech industries (Chung & Alcacer, 2002). In addition, while high labor cost generally deters 
firm‟s entry, a firm‟s labor intensity magnifies the impact of this factor in its location decision 
(Hong, 2009). Using country of origin as a proxy for firm heterogeneity, Yamawaki (2006) 
found that Japanese multinationals consider production cost factors more important than 
demand-side factors. This suggests that Japanese firms‟ strategic intent to establish local 
production capacity to export within the EU market. In contrast, both cost-side and demand side 
factors are found to be important determinants of location choices of U.S. firms, reflecting an 
overall different strategy that U.S. MNEs seek in the EU compared to their Japanese counterparts. 
These studies demonstrate how nuanced variations owing to firms‟ inherent attributes and 
strategic intent affect their response to a certain location characteristic differently.  
      While macro-level location determinates of China‟s outward FDI has been examined by 
Duanmu and Guney (2009) and Buckley et al (2007), little empirical analysis has been 
conducted to assess the impact of firm level heterogeneity on this decision. Chinese firms can 
differ from each other in many important parameters, such as their ownership structure, their 
firm level capability, their strategic intention in undertaking FDI, etc. Built upon previous 
investigations, this study attempts to integrate both macro-economic and institutional factors, and 
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firm level heterogeneous attributes and strategic intent to understand the complex decision 
making process of Chinese MNEs‟ location choice.  
 
3. Hypotheses 
In this section, we develop hypotheses on how firms‟ inherent attribute and their strategic intent 
interact with location characteristics and shape their location decisions.  
3.1. Ownership structure and location choice 
The ownership structure is an enduring differentiator of firms in China. Before the economic 
reform initiated in 1978, the Chinese industrial sector was dominated by SOEs. These State 
Owned Enterprises (SOEs) acted as cost centers to fulfill production quotas and provide life-long 
employment. The restructuring of SOEs evolved from implementing a contract system in the 
1980s, which improved internal managerial and incentive systems but left state ownership 
unaltered. This led to the separation of business management from state ownership through the 
creation of domestic joint stock companies in the 1990s. Many SOEs were reorganized into 
limited-liability joint stock companies. A selected group of them were listed on domestic stock 
exchanges. This process, which is termed “corporation” or “partial privatization” (Li, 1997; 
Zhang, Zhang & Zhao, 2001), attracted more capital and helped improve firms‟ performance 
through monitoring by shareholders. In tandem with the restructuring of SOEs, China‟s gradual 
economic reforms fostered the establishment of an ownership system which witnessed the 
emergence of the collectively-owned-enterprises (COEs), township-village enterprises (TVEs) 
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and private-owned enterprises (POEs). For the purpose of our study, we categorize Chinese 
MNEs into SOEs and non-SOEs. For firms with the state (the central government) or the local 
government as the controlling stakeholder, we categorize them as SOEs. The rest is non-SOEs 
considering that private interest dictate the nature and operations of the firm. It is noted that we 
exclude foreign invested firms in our investigation because we are primarily interested in the 
internationalization pattern of indigenous Chinese firms.  
      Recent government led “go-global” strategy has probably enhanced this firm level 
differentiator in their „go-global‟ adventure. It has witnessed many “corporatized” SOEs 
expanding overseas with the visible hand of government intervention. In fact, state statistics 
shows that the bulk of China‟s FDI was made by SOEs due to their rich resource endowment and 
state support (Luo et al., 2009; Fornes & Butt-Philip, 2009). These SOEs usually remain in tight 
state hands, which means that they still align their operations, whether at home or abroad, with 
the government initiative national imperatives (Buckley et al., 2007).  In contrast, private firms 
take a peripheral position in this “go-global” movement with less government assistance and 
limited resources. This inherent condition that differentiates SOEs and non-SOEs may yield a 
divergent trajectory in their location decisions.  
      The undertaking of FDI is a risky process. Firms have to face new business and institutional 
environment, and overcome cultural and regulatory barriers in a foreign country to conduct 
business. This is often called “liability of being foreign” (Hymer, 1976) or “liability of 
foreignness” (Zaheer, 1995). Foreign liability takes many different forms but collectively it 
represents the risk of doing business abroad. Even for a same foreign location, however, firms 
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may view its risk profile differently. This could be due to the different level of international 
experience the firm has, which reduces foreign liability. In addition, firm‟s risk taking attitude 
will also affect firm‟s perception and the level of risk that it is willing to take (Sitkin & Pablo, 
1992). Therefore, firm‟s risk taking behavior will have a bearing on their decisions of 
internationalization. Empirical research has found, for example, that firms are heterogeneous in 
their attitudes toward risk (Garcia-Canal & Guillen, 2008). Firms with state equity exhibit a more 
tolerant attitude towards macroeconomic and political instability in foreign countries, but this 
tendency lessens when firms accumulate more international experience and become more risk -
averse in their subsequent investment decisions.   
      For relatively inexperienced Chinese MNEs, we propose that their ownership structure will 
yield a like effect on their location decisions. SOEs can be more tolerant towards risks for two 
reasons. For one, the enduring intervention of the state in the banking system in China has 
produced long-lasting capital market distortions, in which SOEs enjoy preferential treatment in 
obtaining bank loans and accessing the financial markets whereas private firms face ongoing 
capital constraints (Morck, et al., 2008). In addition to the excess supply of capital, the fact that 
most SOEs are led by Party appointed officials renders managers with little individual interest in 
their firm‟s long-term economic performance. Higher risks may be taken to pursue personal 
agendas to advance their career in state bureaucracies or simply advance their personal wealth. In 
contrast, non-SOEs usually have less resource and will tend to be more cautious in their overseas 
expansion. Variance in the extent of principle-agent problem in SOEs and non-SOEs will lead to 
their different attitudes or tolerance towards risks. Therefore, we hypothesize: 
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H1: SOEs are less averse to countries with higher risk compared to non-SOEs. 
      Different ownership structure also renders firms with different competitive advantages and 
disadvantages which will influence their location decisions. Morck, et al (2008) argued that 
SOEs have more experience with chronically weak institutions in China, such as high level of 
direct state intervention, insecure property rights protection, and opaque corporate governance 
compared to their counterparts from developed economies. As a result, they are more capable of 
dealing with burdensome regulations and navigating around the opaque political constraints. This, 
indeed, is in line with internalization theory which posits firms tend to utilize intangible assets 
and capabilities in internationalization. If SOEs had truly developed such capabilities, they 
would prefer to expand into economies with like institutional environments to replicate the 
capabilities and exploit past experience. In contrast, non-SOEs probably do not have the 
competence or the resource to deal with burdensome institutional environment. In fact, 
“institutional escapism” is believed to be one of the principle motives for private Chinese 
investors to go abroad in order to seek better institutional environment for their conduct of 
business  (Luo, et al., 2010). Therefore, we hypothesize: 
H2: SOEs tend to be attracted to countries with extensive state intervention, but this preference 
is absent for non-SOEs.  
      Third, we discuss the possible heterogeneous response of SOEs and non-SOEs to exchange 
rate in their location choices. The impact of exchange rate on FDI has been extensively discussed 
by Froot and Stein (1991), De Mello (1997), Feenstra (1998), and Pain and Welsum (2003). 
Favorable exchange rate increases wealth positions of potential investors and will incentivize 
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them to invest in countries where their home currency value appreciates. Although MNEs can 
also raise fund in host countries via external financing, inexperienced investors may be less 
likely to resort to this solution due to their unfamiliarity with the host country banking system 
and application procedures. Internal and external financing from sources in their home country 
plays a dominant role to support their initial internationalization.  
      Relating to our interest in Chinese MNEs, we suggest that although all firms may want to 
capture the advantage of appreciated home currency (or depreciated host currency), SOEs will be 
more able to capture the advantage due to the financial back up and ready access to foreign 
reserves granted by the government. Duanmu and Guney (2009) found that Chinese outward FDI 
is more responsive to favorable exchange rate between RMB and foreign currencies compared to 
their Indian counterpart. Although favorable exchange rate inflates investors‟ wealth and could 
therefore promote investment, it carries a simultaneous downside, which is that the profit margin 
in the host country may also be negatively affected. Duanmu and Guney (2009) conjectured that 
different reactions to favorable exchange rate between Chinese and Indian FDI could arise from 
the dominance of SOEs in Chinese FDI compared to their Indian counterpart. With easy access 
to foreign currency reserve and weak incentive to concern long-term profitability, SOEs 
dominated FDI will be more responsive to such exchange fluctuations. In contrast, if the outward 
FDI is dominated by private investors, such pattern may be lessened.  
      Our firm level investigation provides us with an opportunity to test this conjecture. We 
propose that the impact of exchange rate on SOEs and non-SOEs is likely to be non-monotonic, 
namely, both SOEs and non-SOEs may respond to favorable exchange rate positively, but the 
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reaction is stronger in SOEs‟ cases. The reason we suggest that non-SOEs also respond to 
exchange rate positively is because since early 2000s, the State Administration of Foreign 
Exchange (SAFE) has begun to issue policies that relax the purchase of foreign exchange by 
private companies, and make the approval procedure less cumbersome. For example, the 
documentation process has been simplified, and the limit on the amount of foreign exchange that 
an organization may retain is raised. These make it possible for private companies to capture the 
short-term benefit of favorable exchange rate, albeit at a lower magnitude compared to their SOE 
counterparts. Therefore, we hypothesize:  
H3: SOEs respond more strongly to appreciated RMB (or depreciated host currency) compared 
to their non-SOEs peers.  
      Fourth, we want to explore how the political goals attached to SOEs may affect its location 
decisions. Lunding (2006) reported that the Chinese authorities have been aggressively courting 
the governments of host states by strengthening bilateral trade relations, awarding aid and 
providing much-needed transport and communications infrastructure to enable Chinese firms to 
access the strategically important raw materials. However, neither Buckley, et al (2007) nor 
Duanmu and Guney (2009) detect any statistical significance of this factor. This clearly 
contradicts to the media populated reports on China‟s booming FDI in Africa and other regions 
such as Australia (Laurenceson, 2007), Russia, Brazil, and Papua New Guinea (Wong & Chan, 
2002) in search for natural resource. We speculate that perhaps country level FDI statistics has 
concealed the firm level heterogeneous response to resource endowments of host locations. 
While a portion of SOEs may receive government support to carry this mission in their overseas 
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adventure, non-SOEs may find it less relevant to their internationalization ambition. We 
therefore suggest the following hypothesis:  
H4: SOEs tend to be attracted to countries with rich natural resources. This tendency is absent 
in non-SOEs.  
3.2 Strategic intent and location choice 
How the strategic intent of FDI influences location choice has been well documented in 
Dunning‟s electric paradigm. Empirically, scholars have provided ample evidence on firms‟ 
nuanced variations to specific location characteristics owning to their different strategic intent. 
For example, it is found technology-seeking FDI are strongly attracted to regions with high R&D 
intensity for the potential externalities of the location, whereas FDI in low-technology industry 
shows little interest in local technical knowhow (Chung & Alcacer, 2002; Alcacer & Chung, 
2007); labor intensive firms react more strongly to labor costs of different locations, and firms 
relying on modern communication infrastructure priorities the information technology 
infrastructure of the local environment in their location decisions (Hong, 2009). It is evident that 
strategic intent, such as access to technology externalities, or lower production cost, shapes the 
location choice of MNEs.   
      We suggest that MNEs‟ strategic intent can be reflected in the activity or the role that the 
headquarters assign to the subsidiary. This view admittedly has an implicit assumption that 
MNEs centralizes its decision making power in the headquarters, and correspondingly, 
subsidiaries have limited autonomy. While such a view can be contentious in other contexts; it 
nevertheless has high empirical relevance to Chinese MNEs (Wang & Suh, 2009). As young 
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MNEs, the relationship between headquarters and subsidiaries tends to be tightly bounded 
owning to a general lack of international experience.  
      There are two kinds of subsidiaries are of our interest: manufacturing and non-manufacturing 
subsidiaries. The former is mainly engaged in production, distribution and promotion of products 
in a host country. The latter is that kind of subsidiaries whose sole role is to facilitate exporting 
and importing intermediate or end products to and from the MNE‟s home country. These 
subsidiaries can be called „trading subsidiaries‟ and some of them will be eventually developed 
into full functional units with manufacturing operation. Following Dunning‟s location specific 
advantage logic, we suggest the principle that MNEs will locate their subsidiaries with different 
roles to the locations that are most productive to the fulfillment of their strategic intent. For 
manufacturing subsidiaries, both demand side and supply side factors are important, which 
include labor costs and market size. For non-manufacturing subsidiaries (trading only), market 
size and potential are probably the sole factor that of significant importance. Therefore, we 
hypothesize: 
H5a: MNEs which invest a manufacturing subsidiary are attracted to countries with cheap labor 
costs and large market size. 
H5b: MNEs which invest a non-manufacturing subsidiary are attracted to countries with large 
market size.  
3.3. Substitutive relation between developed and developing countries 
Finally, we have a broad speculation regarding the potential structurally substitutive relationship  
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between developed and developing countries as investing locations for Chinese MNEs. This is  
prompted by widely spreading anecdotal evidence suggesting that when investing in developed 
countries, Chinese MNEs tend to seek sophisticated technology or advanced manufacturing 
know-how by acquiring foreign companies or their subunits that possess such proprietary 
technology (Child & Rodfigues, 2005; Rui & Yip, 2008). Many high-profiled cross-border 
merger and acquisition cases in developed nations, whether succeeded or failed, have illuminated 
this ambition (Duanmu & Guney, 2009). The decisions to venture in developing countries, 
however, usually differ sharply from those in developed countries, where lower production cost, 
advantageous tariff and quota related status, and perhaps even weak institutional environments 
are the key attractions (Luo, et al., 2010). If this divide goes beyond an anecdotal level, then a 
pattern can be seen with our quantitative examination. Similar estimation has been employed by 
Disdier and Mayer (2004) to test whether there is structurally substitutive relation between 
Eastern and Western Europe as investing locations to French multinationals. The notable 
difference in local competition, institutional environments, and purchasing power of consumers 
between Western and Eastern Europe makes the location choices of French MNEs 
geographically nested. More interestingly, the relevance of this East-West structure is decreasing 
as the transition process of some Eastern economies advances, which adds a dynamic 
understanding to the evolving process of French FDI distribution in this region. We want to 
include such an analysis to assess whether a structurally substitutive relation between developed 
and developing countries also exists for Chinese MNEs in considering their location choice. 
Therefore we propose: 
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H6: There is a structurally substitutive relation between developed countries and developing 
countries. 
 
4. Methodology and data 
4.1 Methodology  
Different from the scenario where only firm‟s characteristics, such as size and experience, are 
considered to affect its location choice, our investigation examines how firm‟s characteristics 
and the countries‟ characteristics collectively shape the location choice. This justifies us to adopt 
conditional logistic regression, which has the advantage of linking between the theoretical 
objective function of a representative location-seeking agent and the likelihood function of the 
empirical model (McFadden, 1974; Alcacer & Chung, 2007; Hong, 2009). We precede our 
estimations in two steps. First, considering all host countries on an equal ground with the 
conditional logit model to test hypotheses relating to firm ownership structure and strategic 
intent. Second, we test the relevance of a developed-developing structure in firms‟ decision-
making process. We estimate this with nested logic model estimation because it allows groups of 
alternative (locations in developing countries versus those in developed countries) similar to each 
other in an unobserved way. Therefore, a structural relation between groups can be detected by 
such an analysis.   
      Our research population is all Chinese firms with foreign subsidiaries in developed and 
developing countries. While such comprehensive dataset is not available at the national level, we 
draw our sample from Jiangsu province, China, in 2009. Our dataset includes 264 location 
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choices by 189 Chinese MNEs investing in 47 countries from 1999 to 2008 (See appendix 1). 
The Chinese MNEs are from different cities in Jiangsu province, with the majority from Wuxi 
and Suzhou, the most economic active cities in the province. For each investment decision, we 
have the data of the year of investment, the chosen country for the investment, and the ownership 
structure of the MNE. The data are provided by local branches of Ministry of Commerce, and 
local economic statistics bureaus, which usually have different emphasize on their data collection. 
The former government arm usually keeps detailed record of the overseas projects undertaken by 
a local firm, such as investment purpose and activities, capital size, and investment location. But 
it collects rather limited information on the investing firm itself. In contrast, local statistics 
bureau keeps longitudinal record of local firms‟ overall business activities through their annual 
statistical census. It is from the latter that we collected the parent firm‟s information, such as 
their ownership structure, size, and profitability.   
INSERT APPENDIX 1 ABOUT HERE 
      There are 47 destinations in which the 264 projects are distributed. We exclude 14 countries 
which only attracted one Chinese FDI because such data do not allow firm (case) specific 
variations to be estimated. We also exclude Hong Kong from the analysis because its dominance 
in hosting Chinese FDI projects could overturn the analysis, and also because it is not really 
„foreign‟ to Chinese firms. Therefore, we are left with 194 projects located in 32 foreign 
locations in the formal data analysis. Regarding the dependent variable, since we have 32 choices, 
it means that there are possible 31 alternatives apart from the chosen destination. In addition, 
since the unit of our analysis is the foreign subsidiary, each individual subsidiary enters the 
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sample only once and therefore our sample dataset constitutes a cross-section, even though the 
period of the analysis covers the year between 1999 and 2008.  
4.2 Variables and measurement 
We explain our dependent, independent, and control variables as follows. Our dependent 
variable is labeled as 1 if the location is chosen, 0 for all other locations no chosen.  The 
following is our country level independent variables. First, we break down risk into two 
components: political risk and economic risk. The data are drawn from PRS group. They are 
both a composite of subjective evaluations of different dimensions of country risk prepared by 
PRS group, a firm specializing in country risks, and published as the International Country Risk 
Guide (ICRG). State intervention is measured by the index of Economic Freedom published by 
the Heritage Foundation and Wall Street Journal. “Economic freedom” measures to what extent 
that freedom of work, produce, consume, and invest are protected and unconstrained by the state. 
Exchange rate uses the average rate of host national currency per SDR for the year subsidiary is 
established. The data source is the IMF. To proxy for the natural resources endowment of a 
country, we employ the percentage of ores and metals exports to total merchandise exports by 
country, as reported by the World Bank in its World Development Indicators. Market size is 
measured by GDP of the country. Labor cost is measured by GDP per capita of the country. 
Development status of the host country is differentiated by developed countries, which are coded 
by 1, and developing countries, which are coded by 0.  The criterion is based on World Bank 
where gross national income (GNI) per capita is the major indicator dividing countries into low 
income, middle income and high income. Low-income and middle-income economies are 
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sometimes referred to as developing economies, and the rest are developed economies.  All the 
country level variables are one year lagged.  
      To test the possible heterogeneous response of MNEs owing to their ownership structure and 
strategic intent, we create a series of interaction terms. First, we assign value 1 to SOEs and 0 to 
non-SOEs to differentiate the ownership structure of the MNE. We also assign value 1 to 
manufacturing subsidiaries, 0 to those engaged in trading as the indicator of the strategic intent 
that the MNE invests with. Then we create 5 interaction terms with ownership structure to test 
the first 4 hypotheses, and 2 interaction terms with strategic intent to test the fifth hypothesis.  
      The following are country level control variables and the reasons for their inclusion. 
Corporate tax has been found to affect the location decisions of FDI in previous studies (Chung 
& Alcacer, 2002; Basile, et al., 2008; Duanmu & Guney, 2009; Buckley et al., 2007). The 
importance of this factor is that it directly relates to the profitability of foreign direct investment. 
The orthodox assumption of profit maximization leads us to propose that a high corporate tax 
rate would deter FDI, unless the motives of investors deviate from profit maximization. Data on 
corporate tax rates is from the Institute of Fiscal Studies (Klemm, 2005), and World 
Development Indicators by World Bank. Unemployment has been considered in some of earlier 
empirical studies rate, such as Chung and Alcacer (2002), Disdier and Mayer (2004) and Basile, 
et al. (2008). Its inclusion in our investigation is based on the consideration that most China‟s 
FDI is in relatively low-tech, high labor-intensive manufacturing sectors, which means that their 
demand for low skilled labor in the host country is high. Unemployment rate in the host country 
may be an advantage for them to recruit low cost labor. However, the counter argument is that 
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high unemployment rate may indicate poor economic health of the host country or rigid labor 
market regulation, and therefore can deter Chinese FDI. We draw this data from International 
Labor Organization (ILO). The impact of distance on the location choice is ambiguous, but 
distance has been widely considered as a necessary control variable in many earlier studies of 
FDI (Basile, et al., 2008). Therefore, we follow this practice and include it in the model. All 
these country level control variables are also one year lagged. The measurement of all variables 
and data sources is listed in more details in Table 1.  
INSERT TABLE 1 AND TABLE 2 HERE 
 
      Table 2 reports the results. Specification 1 reports the base model, which only includes 
country level independent variables. Consistent with conventional wisdom, the variable of 
political risk receives a positive and significant result. Since the index of political risk is 
composed in a way that higher values indicate lower political risk, we interpret this result as a 
less risky political environment attracts more Chinese FDI. This result confirms previous 
findings by Duanmu and Guney (2009), and Buckley, et al (2007).  In contrast, economic risk 
proves to be irrelevant for Chinese firms‟ decision of FDI locations. the statistical analysis yields 
a non-significant result for this variable. Similarly, economic freedom does not achieve 
statistically significant result either. In contrast, exchange rate attains a marginal significance. 
This suggests that all Chinese FDI responds to favorable exchange rate between Chinese RMB 
and the foreign currency where they consider undertaking FDI. Natural resource does not attain 
5. Results        
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statistically significant result, with an even surprising negative sign. This, however, is consistent 
with the finding by Duanmu and Guney (2009). GDP and GDP per capita have attained most 
significant results, among all variables, suggesting that market size is an important attraction for 
Chinese FDI, whereas high cost deters Chinese FDI. Corporate tax is a marginally significant 
factor, deterring Chinese FDI. Unemployment rate of the host country has a negative and 
significant result, suggesting Chinese firms tend to shy away from countries with high 
unemployment rate. Distance does not attain statistically significant result.  
      Now we turn to our hypotheses testing by focusing on interaction terms. In Specification 2, 
interaction variables are added to examine whether firm level attributes alter firms‟ response to a 
certain country level attribute. The first interaction variable is political risk and ownership 
structure. Where political risk in the base model achieved statically significant result, this 
interaction variable does not attain a similar result. We interpret it as that while all firms respond 
to low political risk positively as shown in the base model, state ownership mitigates this overall 
response. Therefore, part of our first hypothesis that SOEs are less averse to countries with 
higher risk countries compared to non-SOEs is supported. Following this, the interaction 
variables between economic risk, economic freedom and ownership structure attain insignificant 
results, similar as those in the base model, suggesting that ownership structure does not alter 
firms‟ reaction to these two factors.  
      The interaction variable of exchange rate and ownership structure attains a highly significant 
result, suggesting that state ownership magnifies the impact of exchange rate on their location 
choice. This is a supportive evidence for our third hypothesis that SOEs respond more strongly to 
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favorable exchange rate than non SOEs. The interaction variable of natural resource and 
ownership structure, however, does not reach a statistically significant result, suggesting that 
SOEs do not respond more strongly to the natural resource endowments of the host country.  
This is probably because the media highlighted natural resource seeking FDI by very large 
Chinese corporations are only portion of the phenomena, and does not represent the general 
picture of state backed-up Chinese FDI.  
      Finally, the interaction variable of GDP and strategic intent achieves a statistically significant 
result with a positive sign. This suggests that the positive impact of market size is magnified 
when the investment intent is for manufacturing. In addition, the interaction variable of GDP per 
capita and strategic intent attains an expected significant result. Its minus sign suggests that the 
negative impact of cost is magnified when the strategic intent is to manufacture products in the 
chosen location.  In other words, manufacturing subsidiaries of MNEs are more deterred by the 
high cost structure of the host locations than non-manufacturing firms. Taken together, the 
results largely support our hypotheses that for manufacturing oriented investment, the impact of 
both market size and low cost structure is larger for their location decisions than for trading 
oriented investment. This probably is because manufacturing subsidiaries tend to be more 
committed to the host location since there is sunk cost embedded in fixed investment. Therefore, 
both market demand and cost factors appear to be more influential in firm‟s decision, namely, 
firms consider these two factors more carefully before deciding to invest. In contrast, trading 
subsidiaries have more flexibility to withdraw their investments, and therefore the impact of 
these two variables on their location decisions tends to be lessened.  
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      We also conducted some robust checks on our results. First of all, we deleted the projects 
conducted by the same MNEs in the same host countries due to the concern that the decision for 
additional investment projects could be very different from the first location decision. There 
were 14 such projects in our sample. It is noted that the number of host countries remains the 
same because we only delete the subsequent investment projects conducted by the same MNEs 
in the same host country. The results are shown in Specification 3. These are nearly identical to 
those in Specification 2. It shows that the small number of repeated investment projects in the 
full sample does not affect the overall results. In addition, we conducted tests by segmenting this 
stripped sample into two by year 2004. This segmentation enables the two sub-samples to have 
similar number of observations for the analysis. Specification 4 reports the results of the 
observations prior to 2004, and Specification 5 reports those after 2004. By and large, the results 
stand and remain almost identifiable to those in Specification  2. 
      Finally, we conduct nested logic estimation to assess whether there is a structurally 
substitutive relation between developed and developing countries. The estimates results, reported 
in Table 3, show that such relationship does not exist. Although the four specifications, in which 
Specification 1 reports the full sample results, Specification 2 reports the results without repeated 
investment projects by the same MNEs in the same host locations, and Specification 3 and 4 
report those of subsample prior to and after 2004 respectively, all achieve acceptable model 
fitness, and the inclusive value falls in the right range between 0 and 1, it is not statistically 
significant across all models. This suggests a structurally substantive relationship between the 
two nests, namely developed and developing countries does not exist.  For the sake of simplicity, 
we do not report the nested logic estimation results which include all the interaction terms, but it 
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is noted that the results obtained are in line with what we report here, namely, there are not 
statistically significant results suggesting a structurally substitutive relation. Therefore, the 
hypothesis that there is a structurally substitutive relation between developing and developed 
countries as desired investment location for Chinese MNEs is rejected.  
INSERT TABLE 3 HERE 
 
6. Discussions and conclusions 
Having presented our results, we now summarize to what extent our hypotheses are supported. 
Basically, our first hypothesis gets a partial support from the empirical result, that is, SOEs 
respond to political risk of the host country less negatively, but this tendency does not apply to 
their response to the economic risk of the host country. In fact, economic risk is found to be 
unimportant for both SOEs and non-SOEs. Our second hypothesis does not obtain empirical 
support, suggesting that SOEs are not more attracted to countries with high state intervention. 
This could be because the capability of dealing with burdensome regulations and navigating 
around the opaque political constraints cannot be easily replicated in different institutional 
environment. Instead, this type of capability can be location specific, and does not generate value 
when the context is elsewhere. This is a rather interesting finding that is worth more studies and 
discussion.        
      The third hypothesis that SOEs respond more positively to favorable exchange rate largely 
gets supports. While both SOEs and non-SOEs respond positively to favorable exchange rate as 
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shown in the base model, this response goes stronger in SOEs‟ case. The fourth hypothesis 
regarding the impact of natural resources of the host country does not get support. This goes 
contrary to our conjecture, but is consistent what was found in Duanmu and Guney (2009). We 
suggest that this may be because the usual media highlighted cases do not represent the large 
proportion of government backed up FDI projects, and therefore a statistical analysis could not 
capture the presence of its significance. The fifth hypothesis regarding how the strategic intent 
influences the location decisions gets empirical support. Manufacturing oriented investment 
projects appear to respond to the host market size and cost structure more strongly, suggesting 
that more caution is taken in the decision making process in relative to trading oriented 
investment projects.  
      Finally, our hypothesis that there is a structurally substitutive relation between developed and 
developing countries is rejected. A simple and therefore very restrictive grouping of such proves 
insufficient to uncover the possible substitutive patterns among regions. It is possible that firms 
consider a combination of many factors in forming the structure of their decision making. When 
some factors that are irrelevant to the divide between developed and developing countries are 
important to their decision making, the hypothesized nested structure between developed and 
developing countries loses relevance. This opens up a rich research agenda in the future as how 
to have further investigations into this issue.  
6.1 Managerial relevance 
      Location choice is one of the most crucial decisions that MNEs need to make in their 
internationalization process because it is costly to alter. Location has a profound impact on the 
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efficiency and effectiveness of firms' overseas investment. Therefore it is crucial for firms to 
carefully assess the compatibility of their investment strategies and the characteristics of the host 
countries to maximize their chance to succeed. The following are the managerial implications we 
draw from our empirical results.  First, we suggest that Chinese MNEs should assess the 
economic risk of the host locations as carefully as assessing their political risk because the 
negative impact resulting from the host economic risks may prove no less profound than that of 
political risk.  Second, our research shows that all Chinese MNEs appear to respond to favorable 
exchange rate very positively, with non-SOEs having a lower magnitude. We suggest that 
although appreciated home currency or depreciated host currency improves the wealth position 
of investors, equal caution should be taken with regards to the implications on long-term 
profitability.  Rapid expansion partially promoted by exchange rate fluctuations needs parallel 
strategic visions and operational investment to ensure long-term profitability and growth.  When 
such visions and investment are not present, Chinese MNEs should think twice about to what 
extent the „advantage‟ will bring real benefits. Compared with non-SOEs, SOEs do not consider 
political risk of the host country as an important factor in their location decisions.  Unless SOEs 
do have the ability to curve political hazards in different countries with their specific network 
connections or other hidden resources, more caution needs to be taken in their future location 
decisions.  
6.2 Limitations 
      Let us reflect upon the limitations of this study.  One of the limitations in our empirical 
model is that we are not able to include more firm level control variables, such as their size, 
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profitability, and international experience. It would be ideal to have these variables because 
previous research has shown that they can affect the location decisions of the firm.  Great effort 
had been made to obtain such data, but the available data for a portion of the firms in the sample 
is insufficient to include them as control variables. Secondly, our measurement of strategic intent 
is rather simple.  It would be more desirable to have a finer categorization for various strategic 
intents that firms have. The secondary data provided by local governments contained rather 
limited, albeit useful, information on this regard.  Questionnaire surveys could be more 
instrumental in obtaining such data, which future studies may like to consider.  A third limit is 
the measurement of natural resource.  Although the ratio of ore and metal exports to total exports 
is widely used as the proxy of natural resource of a country, this measurement cannot measure 
other natural resources that a country possesses.  In addition, if the export of other natural 
resources, such as timber, increases whereas the export of ore and metal remains the same, then a 
country‟s resource endowment proxied by this indicator will appear to be lower. This will also 
weaken the empirical accuracy of this indicator and compromise the empirical investigations 
based on such measurement.  
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Table 1: Variables and data sources 
                      Key variables Measurement Data sources 
                      Dependent variable    
                      Country chosen The choice of the country=1, 0 otherwise This study  
   
                      Independent variables   
                      Political risk A composite index of 5 elements PRS group 
                     Economic risk A composite index of 12 elements PRS group 
                     State intervention A composite index of 10 components Heritage Foundation & WS  
                     Exchange rate Host national currency per SDR IMF 
                     Natural resource % of ores and metals exports to total merchandise exports  World Bank 
                     Market size GDP World Bank 
                     Labour costs GDP per capita World Bank 
                     Development status  Developed=1; developing=0 World Bank 
                     Political risk*Ownership  SOE=1; non-SOEs=0 PRS group  and this study  
                     Economic    
                     risk*Ownership   PRS group  and this study 
                     Economic        
                     Freedom*Ownership  Heritage Foundation & WS and this study 
                     Exchange   
                     rate*Ownership  IMF and this study 
                     Natural   
                     resource*Ownership  World Bank and this study 
                     Market size*Strategic   
                     Intent Manufacturing=1; Trading=0 World Bank and this study 
                     Labor costs*Strategic  
                     Intent  World Bank and this study 
                    Control  
                    variables    
                    Corporate tax   Corporate marginal tax rate World Bank and Klemm, 2005 
                    Unemployment rate % of total unemployment International Labour Organization (ILO) 
                    Distance Kilometers between the capital of various cities in Jiangsu City distance calculator: http://www.geobytes.com 
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Table 2: Conditional (fixed-effects) logistic regression results 
Variables Specification 1  Specification 2 Specification 3 Specification 4 
Before 2004 
Speciation 5 
After 20004 
 
Political risk 0.498** 0.625** 0.625** 0.532** 0.632**  
  -0.206 -0.236 -0.231 -0.212 -0.202  
Economic  risk 1.144 0.327 0.326 0.165 0.185  
  -0.205 -0.321 -0.321 -0.201 -0.231  
Economic freedom 0.018 0.011 0.011 0.021 0.019  
  -0.019 -0.021 -0.021 -0.021 -0.020  
Exchange rate 0.001* 0.000* 0.000* 0.000* 0.000*  
  0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000  
Natural resource -0.054 -0.006 -0.006 -0.058 -0.059  
  -0.011 -0.013 -0.013 -0.010 -0.011  
GDP 2.29e-13*** 2.24e-13*** 2.24e-13*** 2.24e-13*** 2.29e-13***  
  -4.95E-14 -5.90E-14 -5.90E-14 -0.54E-14 -0.59E-14  
GDP per capita -0.000** -0.000* -0.000* -0.000* -0.000*  
  0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000  
Corporate tax -0.042* -0.051* -0.051* -0.052* -0.052*  
  -0.022 -0.023 -0.022 -0.024 -0.023  
unemployment  -0.086* -0.089* -0.089* -0.089* -0.089*  
  -0.041 -0.044 -0.044 -0.041 -0.042  
Distance 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000  
  0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000  
Interaction terms        
       
Political risk * 
ownership 
  -0.443 -0.443 -0.401 -0.402  
    -0.511 -0.511 -0.551 -0.548  
Economic risk * 
ownership 
  -0.828 -0.828 -0.688 -0.702  
    -0.895 -0.895 -0.803 -0.861  
Economic freedom * 
ownership 
  0.014 0.014 0.013 0.013  
    -0.037 -0.037 -0.034 -0.033  
Exchange rate * 
ownership 
  0.000** 0.000** 0.000** 0.000**  
    0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000  
Natural resource * 
ownership 
  0.015 0.015 0.014 0.014  
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      -0.026 -0.026 -0.021 -0.020  
GDP * Strategic intent   2.45e-13*** 2.45e-13*** 2.85e-13*** 2.89e-13***  
    -5.40E-14 -5.40E-14 -5.42E-14 -5.42E-14  
GDP per capita * 
Strategic  intent 
  -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001***  
    0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000  
Model summary       
Pseudo R-squared 0.114 0.1538 0.1541 0.1541 0.1705  
N 6208 6208 6208 2880 3328  
Log likelihood 705.583 712.349 712.352 312.341 402.556  
Prob> chi2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000  
 * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 
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Table 3: Nested logistic regression results 
Variables Specification 1  Specification 2  Specification 3 
Before 2004 
Specification 4 
After 2004 
 
Political risk 0.412** 0.412** 0.328** 0.301**  
  -0.202 -0.202 -0.231 -0.224  
Economic  risk 1.121 1.124 0.307 0.166  
  -0.215 -0.215 -0.301 -0.211  
Economic freedom 0.017 0.017 0.011 0.021  
  -0.019 -0.019 -0.021 -0.021  
Exchange rate 0.001* 0.001* 0.000* 0.000*  
  0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000  
Natural resource -0.055 -0.053 -0.005 -0.053  
  -0.011 -0.011 -0.013 -0.010  
GDP 2.89e-13*** 2.89e-13*** 2.14e-13*** 2.54e-13***  
  -4.85E-14 -4.85E-14 -5.90E-14 -0.54E-14  
GDP per capita -0.000** -0.000** -0.000* -0.000*  
  0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000  
Corporate tax -0.028* -0.028* -0.051* -0.052*  
  -0.012 -0.012 -0.023 -0.024  
unemployment  -0.084* -0.084* -0.089* -0.080*  
  -0.0391 -0.0391 -0.034 -0.041  
Distance 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000  
  0.001 0.001 0.000 0.000  
IV params      
Developed 0.038 0.038 0.012 0.083  
 0.058 0.058 0.016 0.081  
Developing 0.041 0.041 0.024 0.051  
 0.007 0.007 0.004 0.011  
Model summary      
Pseudo R-squared 0.105 0.105 0.125 0.154  
N 6208 6208 2880 3328  
Log likelihood 515.583 515.583 357.349 398.322  
Prob> chi2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000  
*p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001 
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Appendix 1: country distribution of Chinese MNEs from Jiangsu between 1999 and 2008 
Country Number of Chinese FDI Country Number of Chinese FDI 
Afghanistan 5 Macao 2 
Argentina 2 Madagascar 1 
Australia 11 Malaysia 13 
Bangladesh 2 Mongolia 2 
Bolivia 1 Morocco 4 
Brazil 4 Myanmar 1 
Cambodia 11 Netherlands 3 
Canada 4 Nigeria 4 
Congo Republic 2 Pakistan 1 
Egypt 2 Philippines 5 
France 1 Romania 1 
Germany 6 Russia 4 
Hong Kong 58 Samoa 1 
Hungary 2 Singapore 7 
India 3 South Africa 2 
Indonesia 2 Sweden 1 
Ireland 1 Thailand 10 
Italy 1 Ukraine 1 
Japan 9 United Arab Emirates 12 
Jordan 1 United Kingdom 3 
Korea, Rep. 3 United States 31 
Kyrgyz Republic 1 Vietnam 14 
Libya 2 Virgin Island 6 
Liechtenstein 1   
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
 
